Knowledge sharing in communities of practice: A game theoretic analysis

This research applies game theory to analyze the incentives of knowledge-sharing activities in various types of communities of practice (COPs), characterized by individual profiles and decision structures. Indeed, individual decision making results in the under-provision of knowledge; however, the benefit of knowledge sharing may be raised by IT investment and suitable incentive mechanisms we study here. In general conditions, improving communication and collaboration technologies should be prior to developing data mining technologies. However, when the number of community members is sufficiently small and the heterogeneity of the expected value of knowledge among community members is sufficiently large, developing data mining technologies should be considered more important than the other if most community members are low-type ones. On the other hand, based on a screening technique, we find that the benefit of knowledge sharing in the incomplete information setting can be the same as that in the complete information setting if the cost of more efficient community member is smaller than that of less efficient one.     

Comparing frontier methods for economic–environmental trade-off analysis

This paper uses a mechanistic frontier approach as a reference to evaluate the ability of conventional parametric (SFA) and non-parametric (DEA) frontier approaches for analyzing economic–environmental trade-offs. Conventional frontier approaches are environmentally adjusted through incorporating the materials balance principle. The analysis is worked out for the Flemish pig finishing case, which is both representative and didactic. Results show that, on average, SFA and DEA yield adequate economic–environmental trade-offs. Both methods are good estimators for technical efficiency. Cost allocative and environmental allocative efficiency scores are less robust, due to the well-known methodological advantages and disadvantages of SFA and DEA. For particular firms, SFA, DEA and the mechanistic approach may yield different economic–environmental trade-offs. One has therefore to be careful when using conventional frontier approaches for firm-specific decision support. The mechanistic approach allows for optimizing performances per average present finisher, which is the production unit in pig finishing. Conventional frontier methods do not allow for this optimization since the number of average present finishers varies along the production functions. Since the mechanistic production function is based on underlying growth, feed uptake and mortality functions, additional firm-specific indicators can also be calculated at each point of the production function.     

Incorporating both undesirable outputs and uncontrollable variables into DEA: The performance of Chinese coal-fired power plants

There are two difficulties in doing an objective evaluation of the performance of decision making units (DMUs). The first one is how to treat undesirable outputs jointly produced with the desirable outputs, and the second one is how to treat uncontrollable variables, which often capture the impact of the operating environment. Given difficulties in both model construction and data availability, very few published papers simultaneously consider the above two problems. This article attempts to do so by proposing six DEA-based performance evaluation models based on a research sample of the Chinese coal-fired power plants. The finding of this paper not only contributes for the performance measurement methodology, but also has policy implications for the Chinese coal-fired power sector.     

The LeChatelier principle in a DEA model

This paper aims to relate the LeChatelier principle, first introduced into economics by Samuelson (1947), with the DEA approach through two propositions. These propositions allow for bridging the principle over a DEA model with and without the presence of non-discretionary inputs and enable one to make comparisons for the various efficiency measures under different conditions. The quasi-fixity of some inputs hinders a firm’s capacity from instantly and freely adjusting its input combination in order to minimize its production costs. The assumption that all inputs are discretionary tends to exaggerate managers’ ability to dispense resources and renders invalid information on the adjustment of the current input mix.     

Mathematical structure of a bilevel strategic pricing model

This paper is concerned with the characterization of optimal strategies for a service firm acting in an oligopolistic environment. The decision problem is formulated as a leader–follower game played on a transportation network, where the leader firm selects a revenue-maximizing price schedule that takes explicitly into account the rational behavior of the customers. In the context of our analysis, the follower’s problem is associated with a competitive network market involving non atomic customer groups. The resulting bilevel model can therefore be viewed as a model of product differentiation subject to structural network constraints.     

Estimating functions for jump–diffusions

Asymptotic theory for approximate martingale estimating functions is generalised to diffusions with finite-activity jumps, when the sampling frequency and terminal sampling time go to infinity. Rate-optimality and efficiency are of particular concern. Under mild assumptions, it is shown that estimators of drift, diffusion, and jump parameters are consistent and asymptotically normal, as well as rate-optimal for the drift and jump parameters. Additional conditions are derived, which ensure rate-optimality for the diffusion parameter as well as efficiency for all parameters. The findings indicate a potentially fruitful direction for the further development of estimation for jump–diffusions.     

Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games

Managerial compensation packages do not only influence managers’ behavior, but also have an impact on competing firms. In a managerial delegation game investigating the latter aspect, it is shown that the inherent prisoner’s dilemma situation can be resolved (without changing the normally studied setup or timing). In the first stage, owners choose an incentive function for their managers, in the second stage they choose the weights assigned to that function besides profits and in the third stage managers play a Cournot game. Solving this continuous optimization problem with the implicit function theorem shows that choosing an incentive from the set of “multiplicative incentives”, i.e. any generalized affine transformation of the product of both firms’ quantities, which includes e.g. relative profit, ensures that the Stackelberg outcome is among the set of equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, it is the unique outcome if the rival owner opts for one of the well-known incentives like sales, revenue or market share. The general approach used allows demonstrating that with no other linear incentive a Stackelberg outcome results and that incentives like profit-to-cost ratio should be avoided. Selecting a multiplicative incentive is a dominant strategy of the game.     

Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: Stability and fair profit allocation

This paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract. We consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration. A cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment. Our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition. We find that in this case, the grand coalition’s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs. Nevertheless, we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains.     

On the confidence preferences model

In this paper we study the model of decision under uncertainty consistent with confidence preferences. In that model, a decision maker held beliefs represented by a fuzzy set of priors and tastes captured by a standard affine utility index on consequences. First, we find some interesting properties concerning the well-known maxmin expected utility model, taking into account the point of view of the confidence preferences model. Further, we provide new examples of preferences that capture ambiguity-averse attitudes weaker than ambiguity attitudes featured by maxmin expected utility theory. Finally, we discuss the axiomatic foundations for the confidence preferences model with optimistic behavior.     

A note on pricing with risk aversion

We consider the pricing problem of a risk-averse seller facing uncertain demand. Demand uncertainty stems from buyers’ valuations being privately observed. By imposing very mild restrictions on the distribution of buyers’ valuations (an increasing generalized failure rate distribution) and the Bernoulli utility function, we show that a risk-averse seller will unambiguously post a lower price than a risk-neutral counterpart.